Executive Summary
Haiti’s elections have been pushed back by roughly 7 months. The CEP's revised calendar sets the first round of elections for July 18, 2027, and the one-off for October 4, 2027. The extended candidate filing period closed with 21 presidential candidates, including former president Joseph Michel Martelly, after an amended decree loosened candidacy requirements, including removing the clause barring candidates sanctioned by the UN, the U.S. Treasury, or other governments. Registration stands at 920,107 as of November 7, about 23% of the CEP’s 4 million target. The delay also raises a governance question because the political accord backing the current government was expected to hand over to an elected government by February 2027. Whether Prime Minister Fils-Aimé stays or a new transitional arrangement is negotiated is now open.
On security, the Security Council extended the GSF through March 2027. Following the October 18 ambush that left four Salvadoran aviation technicians missing and, according to subsequent reporting, dead, El Salvador responded by deploying more than 2,000 additional troops and equipment under a bilateral agreement with Haiti. This has dramatically shifted the balance of power on the ground, leading to some gang leaders having since retreated or called for dialogue. While the new Salvadoran contingents add muscle to Haiti's existing security forces, they also introduce a coordination risk. The GSF, the Salvadoran force, private security contractors, and Haitian forces operate under different rules and commands within densely populated urban environments. Meanwhile, gangs still control major areas, are blocking roads in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac, and have retaliated against civilians after operations in Arcahaie and Gros-Morne, while police retook Gressier.
Economically, a World Bank report shows Haiti has registered seven straight years of contraction, with 49% of Haitians below the poverty line and 5.7 million in acute food insecurity. The report ties recovery to restoring security, especially in the capital region. In Washington, the midterm results could bring more congressional scrutiny of U.S. engagement on security, elections, and humanitarian aid in Haiti.
Lastly, we are watching the pace of voter registration against the new calendar, coordination between foreign and Haitian forces, and who governs Haiti in the gap before the vote.
Key Developments
Security
On September 29, the U.N. Security Council voted to extend the mandate of the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) by six months (March 2027). Less than three weeks later, the mission would suffer its first major casualties when four Salvadoran aviation technicians got ambushed and have never been seen since. The incident took place in the Santo 17 area, Croix-des-Bouquets area, just east of Port-au-Prince, an area controlled by the gangs 400 Mawozo and Chen Mechan. There has been no official confirmation from either the GSF, the Haitian government, or El Salvador about whether the men are still alive. Still, public appearances by the leader of the 400 Mawozo gang, Lanmò San Jou, and subsequent reporting by AyiboPost seemed to confirm that they are no longer alive. In response, El Salvador has deployed over 2,000 more soldiers and military hardware to “rescue and support ongoing military actions against the gangs.”
A Shift in the Balance of Power
Since the October 18th event and the subsequent deployment of Salvadoran forces, the balance of power on the ground between gangs and the security forces has shifted dramatically. A defiant Lanmò San Jou in the first days after the ambush displayed guns, ammunition, and called on his soldiers and those of Chen Mechan (who is responsible for the ambush according to Lanmò San Jou) not to back down.
Faced with the new reality, Lanmò San Jou began to call for dialogue. People close to Chen Mechan reported that the group described the October 18th incident as a "regrettable mistake.” Lanmò San Jou sent a letter to the United Nations, in which he pleaded for de-escalation, arguing that confrontations will lead to too many casualties among civilians. Recent videos of Lanmò San Jou and others from his group suggest that they no longer live in the gang leader’s big house in Croix-des-Bouquets.
Meanwhile, other gang leaders who had previously shown resolve quickly retreated, including through limited social media appearances. In a recent video, Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier began naming politicians he or other gang leaders are close with or have worked with before, including André Michel and presidential aspirants such as Clause Joseph and Moïse Jean Charles. Some gang leaders also began to coerce the population in their neighborhoods, including Jeff Gwo Lwa in Canaan, to protest against the deployment of new Salvadoran forces. According to many reports, residents in those neighborhoods are prevented from leaving, and the gangs also blocked major roads leading to them; in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac, roads such as Marin, Carrefour Shada, Croix-des-Missions, and Butte Boyer are impassable.
Ongoing operations
In Arcahaie, police operations on October 29 led to over 20 deadly-shot gang members, including one of their leaders, Galaxy (Galazie), operating a gang in the strategically important community named Bercy, along Route National 1 (RN1), linking the North and the capital. Bercy’s gang, with the support of other gangs in the Arcahaie and Cabaret regions, retaliated and killed over 15 people, including police officers, from October 31st to November 2nd. Police forces alongside the population responded with a series of operations against armed actors, leading to the killing of several more and the liberation of 22 people kidnapped and held in the locality of Lavila.
Reports from locals also spotted the presence of Frantz Valmyr (a.k.a. Izo 2, Dady, Didy, Didi) - who was leading the gangs operating in Kenscoff until recent sustained attacks from security forces - in Arcahaie, fleeing his stronghold in Kenscoff. His presence in the area is seen as intentionally designed to organize the local Taliban and Canaan gangs to push directly into Arcahaie and seize control of the commune.
In Artibonite, the mayor of Gros-Morne has urged residents to leave gang-controlled areas after the gang Kokorat San Ras retaliated following a GSF-led operation. Municipal authorities temporarily suspended all traffic on Route Nationale 5 until further notice. This decision affects travel between Gros-Morne, Port-de-Paix, Gonaïves, and Port-au-Prince as the security situation deteriorates and the risk of collateral damage increases.
In Gressier, the Haitian National Police, PNH, launched an operation on October 14 to dislodge the 103 Zombies gang, part of the Viv Ansanm coalition, who have occupied the area for over a year. Local media reported that the operation included several units of the PNH, such as SWAT, UTAG, BRI, and the Task Force, and led to several casualties in the 103 Zombies camp. According to local authorities, the Haitian armed forces have reclaimed the city's police station and destroyed the 103 Zombies gang base, which the criminals used to extort people. The security forces have secured Route Nationale #2 and fully restored government control over these previously gang-held areas.
A new report by the Réseau national de défense des droits humains, RNDDH, found that at least 164 people were killed, more than 70 kidnapped, and dozens missing. The report, which the network said is backed by interviews with judges, police officials, armed civilians, the former head of a police station, and more than 100 victims and their relatives, strongly criticized what it called “police passivity” and the “disdainful disinterest” of high-ranking officials, noting that a timely reinforcement could have prevented or limited the massacre.
U.S. Elections
Balance of Power in Congress
Live election results tracking Democratic and Republican seat totals in the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate.
Source: Polling Desk . Results are unofficial until certified.
The U.S. midterm elections saw the Democratic Party win enough seats to control both the House and the Senate in the next U.S. Congress. While this may not directly affect the U.S. administration's policy toward Haiti, it could reshape ongoing or future engagement, especially in security, elections, and humanitarian support.
Policy Implications of new security forces deployment and the U.S. Midterm Elections:
Despite ongoing operations between Haitian armed forces and the GSF and a major shift in the balance of power, Haitian gangs continue to retain significant control of major cities. Additionally, the gangs also orchestrated retaliatory attacks against civilians following GSF operations. This strategy from the gangs would also compel Haitian authorities and the GSF to take further protective measures to support the population following security operations.
With the deployment of Salvadoran forces and the arrival of new military hardware and equipment, the security forces received a significant boost in planning future operations. Indeed, the fear this new reality invoked among the armed actors is also notable. However, it also introduces a new set of challenges:
The operational framework is another issue. The GSF operates under the UN Security Council mandate. The new Salvadoran forces operate under a bilateral engagement agreement between Haiti, the Haitian government, and El Salvador. There is a risk of misalignment in engagement levels.
Operational: The GSF, the new Salvadoran forces, private military contractors (Vectus Global), and Haitian forces (the PNH and the Haitian Army) are all operating in the same environment but under different rules and command structures. This can reduce effectiveness and lead to operational miscalculations.
Lastly, the quasi-independent nature of the security forces on the ground can lead to unexpected casualties for which no one group wants to take responsibility.
While the new Congress will not necessarily change U.S. engagement with Haiti (as this is an executive branch matter), it will certainly play a role that can either bolster or limit U.S. Haiti policy.
The new Congress will be more receptive to human rights issues and concerns and will seek to hold officials accountable. Committees will also increase oversight, which means government officials and other stakeholders will be invited to appear before Congress for hearings and briefings more often. When lawmakers want change, they will have more power to demand it and, in some cases, force it. They may also compel government officials to distance themselves or stop engagement in other areas where they have more leverage, including through budget appropriations.
Haitian Elections :
After the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) released an amended decree loosening some requirements and extending the online candidate registration deadline, former president Joseph M. Martelly formally registered to run in Haiti’s next presidential election under the new political party Debloke. Among other things, the new decree modified Article 153 to remove clauses 20 and 21:
Clause 20: Requiring a certificate from the Bank of the Republic of Haiti (BRH) proving that the candidate was not subject to a check-writing ban, insolvent, or bankrupt. That clause also banned any persons sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (OFAC), or other foreign governments.
Clause 21: Requiring a certificate from the National Old-Age Insurance Office (ONA) and the Industrial Development Fund (FDI) to certify that the candidate had no unpaid loans with these institutions.
According to the new electoral calendar, the first and second rounds of elections are scheduled for July 18, 2027, and October 4, 2027, respectively.
The new electoral calendar reflects the challenges Haiti faces on the road to its first elections in a decade. Beyond security challenges, the CEP also faces logistical issues that will continue to challenge the institution. This includes:
Registrations: As of November 7, 2026, the CEP has registered 920,107 people, with 1,317 registration centers operating out of 1,445. So far, 21 candidates have registered for the presidential race, 404 for the senate, and 1,429 for the lower chamber, with 2,131, 3,042, and 1,984 candidates for mayors, CASEC, and ASEC, respectively. Drivers of low registration include the fact that citizens must register in person, often risking their safety to reach a registration center; distrust of politicians; and those who do not yet believe in the process. The CEP has also deployed mobile voter-registration teams (ADRE agents) to workplaces and shopping areas to boost registration.
Diaspora votes: There is still no workable plan to register and allow the diaspora to vote, despite numerous promises and regular travel by government officials to meet and reassure diaspora members that they will have that opportunity.
Allegations of fraud: On its website, the CEP stated it had detected over 27 million fraudulent member registration attempts from political parties. This raises questions about potential identity fraud and data privacy, given that Haiti has only about 6 to 7 million eligible voters. While the impact is still marginal, larger-scale voter fraud or data privacy issues could create new challenges for the CEP, the election's legitimacy, and post-election stability.
Election finance: The total budget of the electoral process remains $120 million. According to the latest reports, contributors have already provided $80,6 million to the Basket Fund, managed by the U.N. Development Program. The Haitian government will provide the remainder through the 2026-2027 fiscal year budget.
Registration and Electoral Readiness
Haiti's electoral preparations continue amid security constraints, limited public confidence, and questions about electoral inclusion and integrity. While registration infrastructure has expanded, participation and implementation remain critical indicators of readiness.
Registration data as of November 7, 2026
Electoral Infrastructure
Registration Center Capacity
The CEP reports that 1,317 of its 1,445 registration centers are operational, although accessibility and security conditions remain uneven.
Political Participation
Candidate Registrations
Reported candidate registrations across national and territorial offices. These figures do not necessarily represent final approved candidacies.
Key Challenges
Participation and Electoral Integrity
Four issues warrant continued monitoring as the CEP advances preparations for the 2027 elections.
Security and In-Person Registration
Citizens must register in person, creating significant barriers for those living in areas affected by gang violence. Traveling to registration centers may expose individuals to security risks. Distrust of politicians and skepticism about the electoral process further constrain participation.
Mobile Registration Teams
The CEP has deployed mobile voter-registration teams, known as ADRE agents, to workplaces and commercial areas. The initiative aims to improve accessibility and expand registration beyond traditional centers. Its contribution to overall registrations will be an important indicator to monitor.
Diaspora Voting Remains Unresolved
Despite repeated government assurances and consultations with diaspora communities, no workable mechanism has been established to register eligible Haitians abroad and enable them to vote. The lack of an operational framework raises concerns about the inclusiveness of the process.
Fraudulent Registration Attempts
The CEP reported detecting more than 27 million fraudulent political-party membership registration attempts. The figure raises questions about identity verification, cybersecurity, and personal data protection. These reported attempts do not establish that fraudulent voter registrations occurred. Transparent investigation and effective safeguards will be critical to electoral credibility.
Election Financing / USD
Financing the Electoral Process
The electoral process carries an initial budget of US$120 million. Contributions to the UNDP-managed Basket Fund account for approximately two-thirds of that amount, with the remaining financing expected from the Haitian government.
The remaining financing is expected through Haiti's 2026–2027 fiscal-year budget. Reported contributions do not necessarily represent funds expended or available for immediate use. Budget requirements may change as electoral preparations advance.
The new electoral calendar also raises questions about governance in Haiti. While the political accord- the National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections - that backed the current government had no clear end date, the expectations were that elections would be organized by the end of 2026 for a new government installed by February 2027. With the election postponed again until summer 2027, stakeholders will have to address whether Prime Minister Alix D. Fils-Aimé will stay or whether new negotiations will take place for a new transitional government. Several political organizations have already called for a new political consensus.
Economy
A report by the World Bank highlighted the level of distress of the Haitian economy: seven consecutive years of GDP contraction, 49% of people living below the poverty line, and 5.7 million people facing acute food insecurity. Haiti retains substantial economic potential, including a young and growing labor force, competitive wages, proximity to major markets, a resilient diaspora, and agricultural potential in high-value export crops. But Haiti’s return to growth hinges on restoring security and a functioning state in the metropolitan area, even as the more stable northern and southern corridors offer the clearest near-term opportunity.
On September 30, the Haitian government published a circular prohibiting third-country merchandise from entering Haiti through the Dominican Republic. All goods, according to the circular, must be directed to Haiti to go through customs.
Miscellaneous/Other
In New York. Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anita Anand, met with her Haitian counterpart on the margins of UNGA 2026, during which she announced CAD$ 25.4 million to support security, governance, and community resilience in Haiti.
According to recent reports, Haiti’s interim government has hired Trump ally Roger Stone to lobby the U.S. Government on Haiti's behalf for a contract worth $780,000 a year.
State of Play on Other Key Issues
As of today, the GSF is operating substantially below its authorized strength. While the six-month renewal (instead of the usual 12 months) is designed to facilitate the mission to speed up its full operational capacity, HPH believes that observers will continue to assess the GSF against other benchmarks, such as how many roads it has helped unblock, how many gang leaders or soldiers it has either captured or eliminated, what percentage of gang-controlled territories it has helped reclaim, and above all, how it helped restore a modicum of public safety to facilitate a safe electoral process.
Renewal of sanctions regime and Panel of Experts on Haiti
The Council also voted on October 14 to renew the sanctions regime on Haiti for another year, maintaining the arms embargo and the travel ban and asset freeze for individuals and groups considered responsible for or involved in enabling Haiti’s instability. The U.N. Security Council also renewed the mandate of the U.N. Panel of Experts on Haiti, whose latest report shed more light on the interconnection between Haiti’s political class and the gangs, for another 13 months.
Outlook
Given the recent delay in the electoral process, with elections rescheduled for the first round in July 2027 and the run-off in October 2027, it will be important to watch whether there is any pressure on Prime Minister Fils-Aimé for a cabinet reshuffle.
With the GSF's six-month renewal, observers will look for tangible progress on the ground. However, HPH is also tracking other key indicators, mainly the deployment of uniformed and civilian personnel, financial contributions, and material resources. Additionally, while deploying more than 2000 Salvadoran forces will add more muscle to security operations, it will also create a coordination challenge. We expect a coordination framework to emerge among the Salvadorans, the GSF, and the Task Force (Vectus Global), and it may include, to some extent, the Haitian security forces.
We are also monitoring how the new Democrats-led U.S. Congress, starting in January, will position itself on the Haiti issue, including the confirmation - if not done before January - of the new designated U.S. ambassador to the country, Austin Holmes. Holmes is a Florida businessman who has worked on humanitarian and security efforts in Haiti. The nomination is currently pending before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.